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agree and thus must be adjudicated, the courts have supported solid estimates of forgone fees for 
determining damage awards, based on careful, defensible calculations of the hotel’s performance during 
the prospective contractual period. The methodology outlined in this paper provides a way to establish 
with reasonable certainty the damages that occur from the involuntary termination of a hotel 
management agreement. While many hotel management agreements contain a liquidated damages 
clause that establishes the termination fee when the parties agree to terminate the contract, these 
liquidated damages clauses are not applicable in a situation where the hotel management agreement is 
terminated even though the manager has not breached the contract. This report provides a numerical 
example demonstrating that the actual damage amount is at least twice and potentially five times the 
amount of a typical termination fee. An analysis of recent court cases shows that the courts accept the 
methodology proposed here, although they may debate the assumptions that underlie the calculations 
(such as the anticipated inflation rate). What courts will not accept are unsupported estimates and 
certain expense claims not expressly found in the contract language. 
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Calculating Damage 
Awards in Hotel 
Management Agreement 
Terminations
by Jan A. deRoos and Scott D. Berman
W
hen a hotel management agreement is terminated without the consent of the manager, 
the law clearly allows the manager to recover damages (from the owner) as a result of 
the termination. In most cases, the owners and managers resolve their issues without 
litigation. For the substantial number that cannot agree and thus must be adjudicated, 
the courts have supported solid estimates of forgone fees for determining damage awards, based on 
careful, defensible calculations of the hotel’s performance during the prospective contractual period. 
The methodology outlined in this paper provides a way to establish with reasonable certainty the 
damages that occur from the involuntary termination of a hotel management agreement. While many 
hotel management agreements contain a liquidated damages clause that establishes the termination fee 
when the parties agree to terminate the contract, these liquidated damages clauses are not applicable in 
a situation where the hotel management agreement is terminated even though the manager has not 
breached the contract. This report provides a numerical example demonstrating that the actual damage 
amount is at least twice and potentially five times the amount of a typical termination fee. An analysis 
of recent court cases shows that the courts accept the methodology proposed here, although they may 
debate the assumptions that underlie the calculations (such as the anticipated inflation rate). What 
courts will not accept are unsupported estimates and certain expense claims not expressly found in the 
contract language.
4 The Center for Real Estate and Finance • Cornell University
Jan deRoos, Ph.D., is the HVS Professor of Hotel Finance and Real Estate and an associate professor at the Cornell 
University School of Hotel Administration. On the faculty of the Hotel School since 1988, he has devoted his 
career to hospitality real estate; with a focus on the valuation, financing, development, and operation of lodging, 
timeshare, and restaurant assets. He is founding director of the Center for Real Estate Finance and founded the 
undergraduate Minor in Real Estate at Cornell University. He teaches courses in the SHA undergraduate and 
graduate degree programs, teaches extensively in the Executive Education programs, and has developed an on-line 
professional Certificate in Hotel Real Estate Investments and Asset Management. His most recent work includes 
publications in the Journal of Real Estate Research, the fourth edition of The Negotiation and Administration of 
Hotel Management Contracts, co-authored with James Eyster, the third edition of the Hotel Valuation Software, co-
authored with Stephen Rushmore, and chapters in the most recent editions of Hotel Asset Management: Principles 
and Practices and Hotel Investments: Issues and Perspectives, both published by the American and Hotel Lodging 
Association.
Scott D. Berman has over 30 years experience, the last 22 years with PwC, where he is currently the industry leader for the hospitality and 
leisure sector, providing real estate advisory services on a multitude of leisure time and tourism related projects including, but not limited to 
hotels and resorts of all types, timeshare and vacation ownership, recreational facilities such as spas and marinas, cruise ships, casinos, theme 
parks and other public assembly facilities. He has extensive experience in dealing with complex business issues as a financial consultant, expert 
witness, and arbitrator. Mr. Berman has been a qualified as a lodging industry subject matter expert on dozens of cases at both the Federal 
and State levels and has testified before several international tribunals. 
Mr. Berman is also a frequent speaker at major industry conferences including those of the Urban Land Institute, 
ALIS & The American Hotel & Lodging Association, AICPA, New York University Investment, and has spoken at the 
Dean’s Distinguished Lecture Series at the Cornell University School of Hotel Administration.
Mr. Berman is an active member of the Urban Land Institute Hotel Development Council (HDC) and its former Chair; 
a member of the Advisory Board of the Cornell University Center for Hospitality Research and the Center for Real 
Estate and Finance; Chairman of the Industry Relations Committee for the Greater Miami and the Beaches Hotel 
Association; and a member of the International Society of Hospitality Consultants. He is a former member of the 
Board of Directors of the American Resort Development Association. He has appeared on CNN and CNBC as a 
leisure industry expert and is frequently quoted on hospitality issues in The Wall Street Journal, USA Today, The New 
York Times, Forbes, and a variety of industry publications.
The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of our former students and interns who helped in researching this report, 
Isabelle Claver, Eric Rabinowitz, and Sandy Li.
ABOuT THE AuTHORS
Published in conjunction with
CREF Report Series • August 2014 • www.cref.cornell.edu 5
Calculating Damage Awards in 
Hotel Management Agreement 
Terminations 
by Jan A. deRoos and Scott D. Berman
CORNELL REAL ESTATE AND FINANCE REPORT
T
he “great recession” that followed the financial panic of 2008 produced strains in the relationships 
between hotel owners and management firms that continue to play out—often with hotel 
operators finding that their management agreement may be terminated against their will and 
outside the provisions of the contract.1 The majority of these cases involve one of two “involuntary 
termination” scenarios:
• A dispute between the hotel owner and operator in which the owner is attempting to terminate the 
management agreement, or
• A hotel bankruptcy proceeding in which creditors or a bankruptcy judge seek to terminate the 
management agreement as part of the bankruptcy proceeding.2
1 In instances where the operator co-invests with the owner, the relationship is more complicated. Case law treats these instances as agency coupled with 
an interest, which makes it much harder to terminate the hotel management contract (HMA).
2 Four recent HMA termination actions are found in the opening paragraph of “United States: Hotel Management Agreement Termination Disputes: Is 
there Shelter from the Storm”, Allison McCarthy, Holland & Knight, October 18, 2013 (www.hklaw.com/publications/Hotel-Management-Agreement-
Termination-Disputes-Is-There-Shelter-from-the-Storm-10-15-2013/). Quoting from the article: 
  In the wake of Fairmont v. Turnberry and M Waikiki LLC v. Marriott Hotel Services in 2012, the hospitality industry was abuzz about the dramatic 
ousters of the hotel operators by the hotel owners. The sensational events attracted even non-lawyers to read about these cases. A debate raged 
about whether a hotel owner should have the power to terminate a hotel management agreement at will, without notice or cause, and the effect this 
power would have on the hospitality industry, where the revenue streams from hotel management agreements are a key component in the valuation 
of brand management companies. As the hospitality industry reconsidered its business model in response to these cases, the setting continued to 
change as a result of the recent holdings in Marriott International v. Eden Roc and RC/PB, Inc. v. The Ritz Carlton Hotel Company.
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Both of these scenarios became much more common 
in the economic downturn, with owners who face financial 
pressure being much more likely to exercise their options to 
terminate. In June 2014, we conducted a Bing search on the 
terms “hotel management (contract or agreement) termina-
tion,” which returned 484,000 hits on the web and 25,800 
results in news articles related to the phenomenon. The news 
articles are heavily concentrated in the periods following 
the two most recent economic downturns, the period from 
2001 through 2003 and again from 2009 to 2012, but they 
are found around the world. For instance, an Indian hotel 
publication wrote: “… the key reasons for the termination of 
operator agreements are poor operator owner relationship, 
and most of the time it’s emotional disconnect. Both parties 
may have merit in their side of argument but fail to find 
alignment.”3 
The use of management contracts for hotels grew 
substantially after the 1930s, replacing an earlier model in 
which owners would lease their properties to management 
firms. As investor risk aversion and regulation decreased, 
owners significantly reduced their practice of leasing hotels, 
preferring to use a management contract in lieu of the lease.4 
Through the use of management agreements, operating 
companies historically took the role of agent and were paid 
a negotiated management fee (typically comprising base and 
incentive fees). In this arrangement, owners bear more risk 
than in a fixed lease arrangement with an operator.5
For the purposes of this discussion, a key aspect of 
management contracts is their longevity. Some contracts 
have terms of up to 100 years for the best managers. Even 
contracts that fall short of a century can be quite lengthy. In 
The Negotiation and Administration of Hotel Management 
Contracts, Eyster and deRoos find that the average contract 
term for a branded operator is 36 years (a 16-year initial 
term and two ten-year renewals that can be extended unilat-
erally at the operator’s option), and the averages are 14 years 
3 “Hotel Change-Overs: The nouveau trend,” Hospitality Biz India.com, 
April 14, 2014.
4 See: George O. Podd and John D. Lesure, Planning and Operating 
Motels and Motor Hotels (New York: Ahrens, 1964): “In the 1930s and 
later, several professional management organizations specialized in the 
operation of hotel properties on a fee basis. Recently we have noted simi-
lar contracts negotiated in the motor hotel field” (p. 199).
5 The authors acknowledge the considerable literature and controversy 
regarding the owner’s agent in hotel management agreements. For 
example, see: Eyster and deRoos, The Negotiation and Administration of 
Hotel Management Contracts, 4th edition, (New York: Pearson Custom 
Publishing, 2009); K. McDaniel, “Current issues in the negotiation of ho-
tel management agreements,” in Modern Real Estate Transactions, ed. M.T. 
Carroll (Philadelphia: American Law Institute/American Bar Association, 
2005), pp. 597-646; and J.S. Renard and K. Motley, “The agency challenge: 
How Woolley, Woodley, and other cases rearranged the hotel-management 
landscape,” Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly, Vol. 
44, No. 3 (2003), pp. 58-76.
for independent operators managing full-service hotels and 
19 years for independent operators managing select-service 
hotels.6 
If all goes well, the lengthy terms create stability for 
both parties. However, the long terms also raise the ques-
tion of how to compensate the manager if the owner finds 
it necessary to terminate the contract. Many contracts have 
explicit language regarding manager compensation should 
the contract be terminated per the terms of the contract—
usually for cause, with termination fees of up to four times 
the most recent annual fee.7 Few contracts grant the owners 
the right to terminate contracts without cause, however. A 
majority of contracts do grant the owner the right to termi-
nate contracts upon sale of the hotel, and lenders often have 
the right to terminate the contract upon foreclosure.
Involuntary termination scenarios universally fall 
outside of any contract, and calculating termination fees 
in these cases calls for a different methodology than found 
in contract termination clauses. In general, operators feel 
that they should be made whole financially, and when long 
terms remain on a contract, the operator’s loss of fees is 
significantly larger than the for-cause termination fees found 
in contracts. We must emphasize that most owners and 
management firms are able to settle their differences without 
judicial intervention. However, given the number of disputes 
that end up in court, the analysis presented here is valuable 
for the industry.
Further, based on recent court decisions, it is clear that 
there is little in the lodging literature to guide those seek-
ing to prepare an estimate of damages, despite a clear legal 
standard used by courts to deal with damage recovery in 
contract breaches.8 Building on recent court decisions and 
other termination events, this article with its related spread-
sheet tool seeks to close the gap in the literature by provid-
ing a reasonable methodology for preparing an estimate 
of damages in the case of an involuntary termination. Our 
proposed methodology, called the present value method, is 
distinct from the multiple method used to calculate termi-
nation fees in many contracts. As part of this analysis, we 
offer a numerical example that will allow users to employ 
the present value method that we describe. We hope the 
methodology will become widely used and cited within the 
industry, and we are making the Excel-based tool available 
on request to author de Roos (jad10@cornell.edu).
6 Eyster and deRoos, p. 59.
7 Ibid., p. 77.
8 While each state in the U.S. has slightly different legal standards, in 
general the courts allow recovery in the amount necessary to place the 
manager in the same position it would have occupied had the breach 
not occurred. This is generally interpreted as the net profits, not gross 
revenues. In the case of HMAs there is disagreement over precisely what 
revenues are forgone, and which expenses need to be deducted in order to 
arrive at an estimate of net profits. 
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to be approximately $30.0 million, which translates to 
$76,500 per key.9
• The former Hyatt Regency in Dearborn, Michigan, is 
the subject of an HMA termination. On January 22, 
2014, owner Royal Realties served a 30-day notice to 
terminate the management agreement of Atmosphere 
Hospitality. The matter is currently under litigation.
• The St. Regis Hotel & Residences, Fort Lauderdale, 
became a Ritz-Carlton, and after lengthy litigation, 
the Sheraton Operating Company was ordered to 
reimburse owner Castillo Grand for certain damages 
resulting from what a court determined was improper 
contract termination, after a dispute regarding non-
payment of a fee. 
Establishing a HMA Termination Claim via the 
Present Value Method
In these examples of HMA terminations, the manager 
seeks to be made whole. But the managers in these cases 
have used various unspecified methods for quantifying 
the damages. In this paper, we propose a methodology to 
estimate the economic loss to the manager as a result of 
the contract termination by directly estimating the dam-
9 The court record gives no calibration on the resort’s revenues or the 
annual management fee. We estimate that the $30 million figure is 
between 15 and 20 times the annual management fee.
Recent Hotel Management Agreement 
Termination Disputes
As we said, the wave of involuntary operator dismissals was 
in the main a fallout of the global recession caused by the 
financial panic of 2008. At many hotels, demand collapsed 
along with revenues, strangling the cash flows to owners 
and causing financial distress. Faced with financial straits, 
hotel owners took a variety of actions, including termination 
or threatened termination of the operating firms’ hotel 
management agreement (HMA). Below is an annotated list of 
recent examples of hotels with pending or completed HMA 
terminations. For each of these, it is clear that the manager 
had an interest in preparing a claim representing the losses 
due to the termination.
• The Paris Hilton Hotel became L’Hotel du Collectionneur 
Arc de Triomphe in August 2012. Details are not available, 
but we are certain that Hilton prepared a damages claim 
as a result of this HMA termination. However, a French 
commercial court found in favor of owner SIHPM in 
ending the HMA.
• The Eden Roc Renaissance Miami Beach was renamed 
the Eden Roc Hotel, Miami Beach in July 2013. Litiga-
tion to terminate the HMA has resulted in a change of 
management, and Renaissance has litigation pending for 
damages resulting from the termination.
• The Shelbourne Dublin, A Renaissance Hotel also was in-
volved in a termination. Litigation to terminate the HMA 
was initiated in 2008 and resolved in 2010.
• Edition Waikiki is now the Modern Waikiki, as of 
September 2011. According to court documents, Mar-
riott claimed damages from HMA termination of $72.0 
million, and was awarded $20.7 million, a decision which 
is under appeal. The $20.7 million figure translates to 
$58,600 per key or about 18 times the estimated 2013 
management fee.
• Four Seasons Aviara is now the Park Hyatt Aviara. The 
Four Seasons management was removed from the hotel 
in 2009, and compensation issues were settled via arbitra-
tion in 2011, including an order from the arbitrator for 
the owner to compensate the manager for the termina-
tion of the HMA, according to published sources.
• Fairmont Turnberry is now the Turnberry Isle, an Au-
tograph Collection Hotel, as of August 2011. In October 
2011, U. S. District Judge Graham issued an order allow-
ing a change of manager, but acknowledged the manag-
er’s right to a damages award. In this order, the damages 
alleged as a result of the HMA termination are estimated 
Exhibit 1
Damages attributable to a hotel management 
contract termination
•	 Lost	base	and	incentive	management	fees	at	the	terminated	
hotel,
•	 Lost	contributions	to	system	reimbursable	expenses	at	the	
terminated hotel,
•	 Loss	of	working	capital,	loan,	or	other	investment	in	the	
terminated hotel,
•	 Loss	of	valuable	employees,
•	 Loss	of	investments	in	the	hotel,	such	as	key	money,	loans,	or	
working capital,
•	 Damages	that	resut	from	ceasing	business	operations	at	the	
terminated hotel,
•	 Damage	to	the	operator’s	reputation	in	the	market	containing	
the terminated hotel,
•	 Damage	to	the	operator’s	reputation	across	the	system,	and
•	 The	direct	costs	necessary	to	re-enter	the	market	containing	
the terminated hotel.
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ages. This section presents guidelines for an orderly, efficient 
approach to producing a damages estimate, consistent with 
established case law for contract damages. We start with an 
exhaustive list of broad categories of damages, as shown in 
Exhibit 1, on the previous page. These include not only the 
loss of expected fees and other revenues at the terminated 
property, but also damages to reputation, human capital, and 
the costs of reentry. 
Monetizing the Damages
Because the damage estimate will likely be adjudicated 
during litigation or arbitration, it is important to establish a 
realistic perspective on what is possible to recover when one 
uses the methodology outlined in Exhibit 2. The courts sup-
port the use of the present value methodology found in steps 
one through five. The damages outlined in step six, while 
real, are much more speculative and much more difficult to 
support in court. Courts are uniformly hostile to awarding 
speculative damages or to awarding damages that have little 
support in their estimate. Only to the extent the damages 
are monetized are they recoverable, and further, only when 
the damages are supported by clear and convincing evidence 
will they be awarded.
Step 1—Establish the Period Covering the Loss
The period covering the loss is broken into three cat-
egories, each with its own probability of occurrence, as we 
Exhibit 2
Methodology for estimating damages in a management contract termination
(1) Establish the Period Covering the Loss—The starting point for all damage estimates is the period covering the loss, which is the 
remaining term of the contract, plus the term expected from any renewal options in the contract or a reasonably expected renewal.
(2) Estimate Property Level Performance—Lost management fee revenues and other contributions are a function of the expected 
performance of the terminated hotel; thus hotel revenues and expenses must be estimated over the period covering the loss.
(3) Estimate Gross Lost Fee Revenue—Three categories of revenue loss are estimated using the estimates of property performance 
over the period covering the loss:
o Base fees—generally based on hotel revenues,
o Incentive fees—generally based on hotel profitability, and
o Other contributions by the owner—these include marketing fees, reservation fees, shared accounting services, shared 
marketing costs, shared regional management, training costs, and similar items enumerated in the management contract.
(4) Estimate Avoided Costs—The gross lost revenue estimates need to be adjusted for any costs so that only the net lost fees are used 
in the economic loss calculation. The appropriate adjustment is to consider the actual marginal costs avoided, not average costs 
avoided.
(5) Determine Present Value of the Net Fee Losses—The lost fees (adjusted for avoided costs) are discounted using an appropriate 
discount rate to establish a present value at the time of the termination.
(6) Estimate of Other Damages
o Investments in the Hotel—The damages may include the recovery of investments in the terminated hotel. These include 
working capital, key money or loans to the owner or the property, adjustments necessary to reconcile accounts receivable and 
accounts payable, provisions for future claims from former guests, or other direct investments.
o Human Capital Damages—Damages can include the costs related to the lost costs of recruitment, training, and professional 
development, and the cost of severance packages for the existing staff, as well as the costs to recruit, train, and develop new 
employees for reentry into the market.
o Reputation Damages—Reputation damages result from the loss of reputation among guests, both at the unit level and system 
wide. Perhaps even more germane, reputation damages should be considered with the community of hotel owners, the 
community of hotel lenders, and the community of hotel operators.
o Damages Due to Reentry—Damages due to the cost of reentry into the market include the costs to identify a suitable 
property, negotiate a contract, and staff, train employees, and prepare the property for operation.
(7) Total the Damages—The sums from 5 and 6 are added to produce a total estimate of damages.
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depict in Exhibit 3. The reason for the three time periods is 
that the probability of a manager’s continuing as operator 
varies at different points in the contractual relationship. For 
the remaining current term, for instance, the probability that 
the manager would have continued is 100 percent, since the 
manager is almost certain to have continued, absent a breach 
of the contract.10
The probability that the manager would have continued 
in place for the remaining contractual renewals depends on 
the contract’s language. In most cases, however, this prob-
ability approaches 100 percent, because many contracts pro-
vide that the manager has the unilateral right to renew the 
contract absent any breach. These clauses are often tempered 
with language giving the owner the right to terminate if cer-
tain performance hurdles have not been achieved, and thus 
the probability of continuation needs to be tempered by this 
fact, if such language appears. Otherwise, we estimate that 
the expected probability of contract renewal is 100 percent.
When considering the category of expected contractual 
renewals in contracts with bilateral renewal rights, we enter 
the realm of speculation. To make these estimates as solid 
as possible, the large global branded operators and hospital-
ity consultancies have excellent historical information on 
renewal rates and terms which can be used to calibrate the 
probability of renewal. 
Thus, the total period covering the loss can extend for 
20 years or more, especially when the contract renewals are 
considered. The importance of establishing the period cover-
ing the loss as the first step is shown next, so that the calcula-
tions are based on the time frame over which the property 
level performance must be forecast.
Step 2—Estimate Property Level Performance
This portion of the work involves a classic market study 
and estimate of future financial performance over the time 
period established in step 1. The analytical framework for 
this work is well documented, with an established proce-
10 The probability of continuing is less than 100 percent if the contract 
gives the owner the unilateral power to cancel the contract at any time, 
generally subject to the payment of a termination fee. For the purposes of 
this paper, this power is moot, as we are modeling the economic losses to 
the manager due to an actual or alleged breach of the HMA.
dural foundation.11 We start with a forecast of occupancy 
percentage and average daily rate (ADR), and from these, 
we can forecast revenues and expenses to establish expected 
profitability over time. A careful analysis will account for 
changes in occupancy and ADR over the time period, as 
well as the impact of changes in occupancy on the fixed and 
variable expenses of the property. Most established method-
ologies can reasonably estimate property performance for a 
five- to ten-year period. Then, for the remainder of the time 
period in the analysis, we can use equilibrium or stabilized 
results adjusted for future inflation.
The equilibrium approach is needed because the longer 
the period, the greater the challenge in estimating the results, 
particularly when the period covering the loss extends 
beyond a decade. In general, the most defensible way to 
forecast long-term performance is to establish a long-term 
equilibrium occupancy and average rate, and then project 
future performance by forecas ting the annual impact of 
inflation on each revenue and expense category within the 
equilibrium. The use of a long-term equilibrium is reason-
able; the notion is to establish the occupancy percentage and 
average daily rate that would exist if the supply and demand 
for transient lodging accommodation is balanced.
Step 3—Estimate Gross Lost Fee Revenue
Estimates of lost fee revenue come from the application 
of the fees scheduled in the HMA to the annual property 
level performance data that are calculated in step 2, starting 
with the gross base fee, which is almost universally a simple 
percentage of total hotel revenues. 
The incentive fee is based on a contractual definition of 
profitability, which in most contracts is adjusted gross oper-
ating profit (known as “Income Before Fixed Charges” in the 
Uniform System of Accounts for the Lodging Industry), less 
any base fee. Some contracts subordinate the incentive fee to 
cash flow after the “owner’s priority.”12 The analysis proceeds 
by estimating profitability according to the definition in the 
HMA and then applying the appropriate fee calculation. In 
this estimate as in the others, it is important that the analyst 
11 See, for example: Hotel Valuation Software at the Cornell University 
School of Hotel Administration: www.hotelschool.cornell.edu/research/
chr/pubs/tools/hvstool.html 
12 Cash flow after the owner’s priority is a measure of profitability that 
makes the incentive fee subordinate to a minimum return to the owner.
Exhibit 3
Elements for calculating period of management company fee loss
Remaining current term Remaining contract renewals Expected contract renewals
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not take any liberties with the language contained in the 
HMA when calculating the annual incentive fee losses. As 
we discuss in greater detail below, courts are not patient with 
inappropriate estimates. 
The other contributions by the owner include contrac-
tual items such as marketing fees, reservation fees, shared 
accounting services, shared marketing costs, shared regional 
management, and fitting cost. Again, the key to estimating 
these figures is carefully reading and applying the language 
in the HMA to the estimated property performance figures. 
Since conjecture has no place in this estimate, the best 
practice calls for the projections to be limited to those fees 
that are specifically outlined in the HMA and can be readily 
estimated. 
The sum of the three figures—lost base fees, lost incen-
tive fees, and lost other contributions—provide the basis for 
the next step, which is to adjust the fee estimate and calcu-
late the present value of those estimated net losses.
Step 4—Estimate Avoided Costs
The lost-fee estimate from step 3 needs to be adjusted 
because there may be costs that the manager will avoid due 
to the fact that the hotel is no longer in the manager’s system. 
Here is another analysis that should carefully estimate only 
those marginal costs that will be avoided, and not merely 
apply average costs. Since the entire damages estimate out-
lined in this article seeks to calculate the marginal economic 
losses to the manager as a result of the HMA termination, 
any examination of avoided costs must consider only the 
marginal costs avoided. This calculation acknowledges the 
fact that the manager will only avoid those costs that are 
directly attributable to the loss of the subject property in the 
manager’s system. The result of this calculation is the annual 
net fee losses to the manager.
The analyst preparing the claim should proceed in a 
manner that anticipates that this section of the damages 
claim may be challenged on two counts; first the claim may 
underestimate avoided costs, and second, the claim may 
omit avoided costs that should be included. The authors’ 
experience with the preparation of such claims suggests that 
courts have little patience for inflated cost avoidance claims 
or the omission of legitimate avoided costs.
Step 5—Calculate the Net Present Value of Losses
In this step the annual net fee losses from steps 3 and 4 
are discounted to the present using an appropriate discount 
rate and standard discounted cash flow methodology. It is 
universally accepted that the base fees and other contribu-
tions are discounted at a rate significantly less than incentive 
fees. The reason is that base fees and other contributions are 
considered inherently less risky than incentive fees, which 
are derived profits rather than revenues. The following 
principles apply to the choice of a discount rate. First, the 
discount rate should not be the firm’s equity cost of capital 
nor should it be the firm’s cost of debt capital. Neither of 
these represents the true weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC) to the firm. By calculating the weighted average 
cost of capital with appropriate risk adjustments as necessary, 
we develop a useful benchmark that is the firm’s true cost of 
capital. Appropriate adjustments can be then made from this 
benchmark. The following specific guidelines explain the ap-
plication of WACC for discounting base fees, incentive fees, 
and other owner contributions.
Base fees. The WACC is the appropriate discount rate 
for the base fees, as these flows are the least risky flows to the 
firm. It could even be argued that for certain assets in gate-
way markets these flows should be discounted at less than 
the WACC, as these flows are less risky than average.
Incentive fees. The WACC plus a risk premium is ap-
propriate for the incentive fees, as these fees are subject to 
more risk. In general, this risk premium is between 300 and 
600 basis points above the WACC.
Other contributions. The WACC is appropriate for the 
other contributions, as these flows are based on revenues, 
not profits.
Step 6—Estimate Other Damages Related to HMA 
Termination 
Calculation of the other damages is more complex. For 
investments in the terminated hotel (as outlined in Exhibit 
2), the analyst must include only those items that are clearly 
identifiable. The loss of investment in human capital is 
clearly included here. The cost of reputation damages or 
damages to goodwill are difficult to quantify, but we consider 
them important to include in a damages claim, especially if 
the HMA termination has received extensive press coverage 
that negatively reflects on the manager. Finally, the analyst 
will have to estimate the cost to the management firm of 
finding another property to reenter the market. This expense 
will be greater in a market that has high barriers to entry. 
Once again, we caution the analyst to include only those 
costs directly related to the loss of the hotel as a result of the 
termination, which will be presented as a lump sum for each 
item. In summary, in preparing the claim, it is important to 
discount future losses with the proper methodology.
Step 7—The Final Damages Estimate
The final damages estimate is the sum of the present 
value of the net fee losses from step 5 plus the damages 
calculated in step 6. The analyst should carefully review the 
total and check all assumptions to make sure the numbers 
are reasonable. While this final step is just mathematics, it 
is nevertheless driven by the assumptions made in steps 1 
CREF Report Series • August 2014 • www.cref.cornell.edu 11
through 6, which are a logical extension of the generally ac-
cepted methods used to estimate future hotel performance.
A Numerical Example  
Using the Present Value Method
To demonstrate the present value method that we have 
explained in this article, we present the results of an Excel 
model to estimate the damages for contract termination 
for a typical chain-affiliated full-service hotel in the United 
States. Our figures come from the STR HOST Almanac 2013, 
U.S. Hotel Operating Statistics for the Year 2012.13 Other pa-
rameters come from the data for the fourth quarter of 2012 
found in the PwC Real Estate Investor Survey published in 
the first quarter of 2013. According to the HOST publica-
tion and the PwC Real Estate Investor Survey, the average 
full-service chain-affiliated hotel in the United States had the 
operating characteristics outlined in Exhibit 4.
The Excel model relies on the widely available Hotel 
Valuation Software (available elsewhere on this website), 
combined with a proprietary software model developed for 
13 Quoting from the STR website:“The Hotel Operating Statistics 
(HOST) program is the most extensive and definitive database on U.S. 
hotel industry revenues and expenses. The operating statements of more 
than 6,100 hotels have been entered into this database, giving STR the 
capability to produce custom reports tailored to a variety of client needs. 
HOST contains information on hotel revenues and expenses and presents 
information by department including rooms, food & beverage, marketing, 
utility costs, property and maintenance, administrative & general as well 
as selected fixed charges.”
Exhibit 5
Assumptions for HMA termination claim example
Period Covering the Loss 25 years with no 
extensions
Property Level Performance—2012 From the HOST 
Report—2012 Results 
with line item detail per 
available room
Property Level Performance—2013 
and beyond
Hotel Valuation 
Software
Inflation on Revenues and Expenses 3.0% for all line items in 
all years
Base Fee1 3.0% of Total Revenues
Avoided Costs, reducing the claim 20% of Base Fees
Incentive Fee2 8.0% of Income Before 
Fixed Charges Minus the 
Base Fee
Other Contributions None; it is assumed that 
any lost revenues are 
accompanied by an 
equal reduction in costs.
Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
(WACC)3
9.04%
WACC Premium for Base Fee 1.0%
WACC Premium for Avoided Costs 1.0%
WACC Premium for Incentive Fee 6.0%
Other Damages4 $0.00
1 Calibration for the base and incentive fees come from Eyster and deRoos, The 
Negotiation and Administration of Hotel Management Contracts, Exhibit III-6, p. 66.
2 The proprietary model is able to easily model an incentive fee that is based on 
income before fixed charges, or an incentive fee based on cash flow after an owner’s 
priority return.
3 A WACC of 9.04% is the average of the WACC’s reported by Bloomberg for Accor 
(9.0%), Choice (7.9%), Hilton (5.1%), Hyatt (10.3%), InterContinental (9.6%), 
Marriott (9.7%), Starwood (12.2%) and Wyndham (8.6%) on Tuesday, February 4, 
2014.
4 Other damages in this instance include nothing for key money, loan advances, 
recovery of working capital, reconciliation of current accounts, future claims, system 
wide effects, and the cost of reentry. Actual cases would range of up to $20,000,000 
or more in some cases.
Exhibit 4
Average full service hotel statistics in 2012
Number of Rooms 296
Occupancy Percentage 71.0%
Average Daily Rate $157.47
Total Revenues $61,233 per available room
Income Before Fixed Charges  $19,108 per available room
 24.7% of total revenues
Net Operating Income1  $15,128 per available room
 18.9% of total revenues
Capitalization Rate 8.02%
Valuation (by Capitalizing  $188,600 per available 
2012 NOI)2   room
1 This is the amount available before debt service or other capital obligations. This 
figure is net of a deduction for a “Reserve for Replacement” of $1,191 per available 
room (1.9% of total revenues).
2This valuation is most likely low as a 2012 valuation would properly rely on a 2013 
Net Operating Income. However, we believe that the 2012 Net Operating Income 
reasonably represents a stabilized figure and are comfortable with the figure.
this article. Using this model, we prepared a damages claim 
as described above. As the analysis relies heavily on the 
analysts’ assumptions, we present the major assumptions for 
this example in Exhibit 5.14
The model produces a total management fee calculation 
of $994,000 in the first year of operation, along with cost 
savings of $109,000, for a net cash damage of $885,000. Over 
14 The full model is available upon request from co-author deRoos.
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the 25-year period covering the loss, the present value of the 
damages is $9,501,000 or $32,100 per room, as summarized 
in Exhibit 6. Given that typical management agreement lan-
guage provides for a termination fee of up to four times the 
most recent 12-month management fee, the methodology 
presented in this article produces a damages estimate that is 
at least double and potentially up to ten times the amount 
found in a typical termination clause. For this reason, it is 
important that managers be aware of the methodology and 
its use when facing involuntary termination.
Commentary on Recent Cases Using the 
Methodology
We offer commentary on the following four recent cases, 
which illustrate the use of the methodology presented above 
when an owner has breached the contract. These cases are 
just a small sample of numerous cases involving contract 
cancellation. The fourth case is an exceptional situation 
where the operator was found to have breached the agree-
ment by early termination. The cases are:
In Re MSR Resort Golf Course, LLC, No. 11-10372 (SHL) (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2012) and In Re MSR Resort Golf Course, LLC, No. 
11-10372 (SHL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2012).
Proceeding on August 10, 2012, and supplemental bench ruling 
regarding debtors’ motion for an order estimating the damages from 
rejection of Hilton’s management agreements on August 23. The 
debtors seek an estimate of the damages Hilton would sustain if the 
debtors reject three management agreements. The management 
agreements relate to three properties: the Arizona Biltmore Resort & 
Spa in Phoenix, Arizona; the La Quinta Resort and Club PGA West in 
La Quinta, California; and the Grand Wailea Resort Hotel & Spa in 
Maui, Hawaii.
In Re M. Waikiki, LLC No. 11-02371, Re: Docket No. 537 (Bankr. D. 
Haw. May 29, 2012).
Amended findings of fact and conclusions of law on estimation of 
Marriott claim at the former Edition Hotel in Waikiki, Hawaii 
FHR TB, LLC v. TB Isle Resort, LP., 865 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (S.D. Fla. 
2011).
Motion for injunctive relief to reinstate Fairmont Hotels and Resorts 
as the manager of the Turnberry Isle Resort in Aventura, Florida. 
While the motion was denied, the court addressed the matter of the 
claim for damages as a result of the termination of the management 
agreement.
Sheraton Operating Corp. v Castillo Grand, NY Slip Op 52438(U).
In a series of actions, courts dismissed Sheraton’s request for 
payment of a $3 million project license fee and $200,000 in attorney 
fees, which it had claimed after issuing a termination notice based 
Exhibit 6
Average chain-affiliated full-service property hotel management fee calculation and valuation
 
"Average" Chain-Affiliated Full Service Property
Hotel Management Fee Calculation and Valuation
Summary Sheet
This sheet summarizes the results of the basic fee, incentive fee, and other contribution claims and summarizes any remaining claim estimates.
Cash Cash Value Present PV 
Categories of Claimed Damages Detail & Backup Total ($'000) Per Key Value ($'000) Per Key
Basic Fee Proforma Sheets 19,878$        67,157$        6,262$          21,154$        
Basic Fee Sheet
PV Calcs Sheet
Cost Savings Basic Fee Sheet (3,976)$         (13,431)$       (1,252)$         (4,231)$         
PV Calcs Sheet
Incentive Fee Proforma Sheets 16,357$        55,261$        3,492$          11,796$        
Basic Fee Sheet
PV Calcs Sheet
Other Contributions Proforma Sheets -$             -$             -$             -$             
Basic Fee Sheet
PV Calcs Sheet
Other Damages
  Recovery of Key Money If Applicable -$             -$             -$             
  Recovery of Loan Advances If Applicable -$             -$             -$             
  Recovery of Working Capital If Applicable -$             -$             -$             
  Reconcile "Payables" and "Receivables" If Applicable -$             -$             -$             
  Provision for Future Claims
     Luggage If Applicable -$             -$             -$             
     Guest Accident If Applicable -$             -$             -$             
     Deposits If Applicable -$             -$             -$             
  System Wide Affects
     Reputation at Subject Hotel If Applicable -$             -$             -$             
     Reputation within Consumer Market If Applicable -$             -$             -$             
     Reputation within Owner/Franchisor Market If Applicable -$             -$             -$             
  Cost of Market Re-Entry If Applicable 1,000$          3,378$          1,000$          3,378$          
Grand Total ($'000) 33,260$        9,501$          
Grand Total per Key 112,364$      32,097$        
Include items 
here as 
appropriate,
modify as 
needed.
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on the assertion of violation of certain contract provisions. The court 
held that the owner was not obligated to pay the fee. Although the 
court granted some of Sheraton’s claims, damages awarded to 
Castillo exceeded $30 million, including interest on a construction 
loan, various pre-opening fees, and loss of property value, among 
other costs.15
At the outset, it is important to note that the first three 
of these are bankruptcy cases, and the fourth arose dur-
ing the 2008 financial panic. We must acknowledge that 
bankruptcy law and procedure are quite different from 
typical litigation, and the Castillo Grand case had numerous 
contract issues for the court to resolve. However, given that 
the parties to most termination cases settle their differences 
via arbitration or other private means, these cases are the 
only publicly available documents that provide a glimpse 
into judicial thought on the methodology. 
The remainder of this analysis focuses on the three 
bankruptcy cases, in which the owner dismissed the man-
ager. In all three cases, the court found that the law allows 
recovery of damages in an amount that would make the 
manager whole absent the termination of the HMA.16 Also 
in all three cases, the hotel manager prepared a damages 
claim that followed the broad outline of the net present value 
methodology to establish a claim with reasonable certainty. 
The methodology presented in this paper was accepted by 
the courts as a reasonable way to estimate the economic loss 
suffered by the manager as a result of a management con-
tract termination. That is, the court accepted that the calcu-
lation of the present value of the fees forgone as a result of a 
termination is an appropriate way to estimate the economic 
loss. In no case did the court duplicate a standard cancella-
tion fee approach by imposing a multiple of the most recent 
twelve-month management fee as an alternative methodol-
ogy for estimating a damages claim. However, in each case 
the various courts took issue with the assumptions and 
details of how the claims were prepared. The courts seemed 
to pay particular attention to discount rates and “other fees.” 
An important aspect of every claim is the use of experts to 
15 For a perceptive discussion of Sheraton v. Castillo Grand, see: I.W. 
Sandman and R.C. Savrann, “The Lessons of Sheraton v. Castillo Grand,” 
www.sandmansavrann.com/index.php?id=150. Also see: See Castillo 
Grand LLC v Sheraton Operating Corp., 2009 WL 4667104 (SD NY 2009)
16 In MHR Resort, the case involves hotels governed by the laws of 
Hawaii, California, and Arizona. The court summarized them by saying 
“These three states generally agreed that, in a breach of contract action, a 
plaintiff may recover the amount of damages necessary to place it in the 
same position it would have occupied had the breach not occurred. The 
usual recovery for the breach of a contract is the contract price or the 
lost profits therefrom.” In M Waikiki, the court stated, “In order to place 
Marriott, the non-breaching party, in the position it would have occupied 
had the contract been performed, damages must include Marriott’s lost 
profits (unpaid management fees minus expenses avoided or reasonably 
avoidable).”
prepare and corroborate the claims. The courts are uniform 
in relying heavily on the testimony of experts in accepting 
claims and are equally dubious of claims prepared solely by 
the claimant and objections raised by defendants.17
With these points in mind, we examine the various 
comments and objections brought by the court and the 
opposing parties. These are organized in accord with the 
Exhibit 2 outline.
Period covering the loss. In all cases, the courts accept-
ed that the period covering the loss was the contract term as 
enumerated in the contract, including both the initial term 
of the contract and any renewals that were specifically de-
tailed in the contract. In no case did the claimant attempt to 
include any extensions beyond those specifically contained 
in the contract, so it is unclear how these would be treated.
Estimate property level performance and the 
resulting lost fee revenue. In every case the claimant 
prepared a claim based on an application of management 
fees to a projection of property level performance during 
the accepted period of loss. In MHR Resort there was a 
controversy related to the future inflation rate on revenues, 
and the court used the defendant’s estimate of 2.5 percent 
rather than the claimant’s estimate of 3.0 percent. In M 
Waikiki the court relied heavily on the claimant’s ADR and 
occupancy projections.18 
Estimate avoided costs. As we indicated above, the 
courts were consistent in applying a rule that they would 
consider only the marginal costs avoided as a result of the 
claim. Quoting from M Waikiki the court states: “The debtor 
argues that Marriott’s claim for management fee should be 
reduced by about 35 to 45 percent for overhead expenses. 
I disagree with this argument.… The only expense which 
Marriott could reasonably avoid because of the termina-
tion of the management agreement is the travel expense for 
periodic visits to the hotel by Marriott central office staff. 
[Claimant’s] estimate of this expense at $100,000 per year is 
reasonable and unrebutted and I therefore accept it. … The 
figure of 35 to 45 percent appears to be the amount of over-
head expense which is allocated to a particular management 
contract for cost accounting purposes. This is the wrong 
standard. Cost accounting requires the allocation of all cost, 
17 As an example, in MSR Resort, the court states “The court rejects as 
self-serving the only other evidence of the actual amount of corporate 
overhead, which was an estimate prepared by Hilton’s treasurer solely for 
the purposes of this litigation.”
18 In the M Waikiki case the debtor objected to the long-term rejection 
of management fees over period of decades as being too uncertain to sup-
port the award of damages. Quoting the court “I disagree and I find that 
the figure set out in this decision had been cruising reasonable certainty 
and that there is a stable foundation for a reasonable estimate of Marriott’s 
future damages. In some respects, the longer projection period is more 
reliable than a shorter. Because the longer period tends to even out inevi-
table variability from year-to-year.”
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avoidable or not, among the businesses’ revenue streams. 
Only avoidable costs are deductible when calculating dam-
ages.” Similarly, in M Waikiki, on the matter of corporate 
overhead (referring to an earlier case involving Hilton) the 
court states: “Even though the management agreements do 
not include the corporate overhead fee as part of the man-
agement fee, there is no dispute that the fee would have been 
earned had the debtors not rejected the Hilton management 
agreements.” 
Present value of the fee losses. The calculation of the 
present value of the fee losses elicited an extensive com-
mentary by the court, specifically in the use of discount rates 
being applied. 
In M Waikiki, the court uses Marriott’s stated weighted 
average cost of capital of 6.5 percent plus a risk premium of 
1.0 percent to discount the first seven years of base manage-
ment fees. The WACC of 6.5 percent plus a premium of 7.0 
percent is used to discount the remaining 43 years of base 
management fees and the incentive management fees. Both 
of these discount rates were presented to the court by the 
claimant, and the court accepted them.
In MSR Resort, the court takes a different approach. In 
this case the claimant seeks reimbursement for the base 
fee but does not seek any reimbursement for an incentive 
fee. After an extended discussion of the WACCs proposed 
by each set of experts, the court accepts the WACC of 10.6 
percent proposed by the defendant. The court then uses its 
own estimate of a risk premium for each hotel adding 1.0 
percent to the WACC for two of the hotels and 2.0 percent to 
the WACC for the more risky third hotel.
Estimate of other damages. We start with a listing of 
other damages claims and the court’s decision on each, fol-
lowed by commentary.
In M Waikiki, Marriott’s claim included the following 
items:
• working capital loans—accepted by the court,
• bonus (severance) payments to employees—accepted by 
the court,
• loyalty program costs—accepted by the court,
• disputed advance deposits—accepted by the court, and
• guest accident claims—denied by the court.
In FHR TB the court found that the owner acknowl-
edged that the operator would suffer damages to its brand 
and reputation in the event of a termination by the owner 
and further that damages would not be an adequate remedy. 
However, in balancing the claims, the court denied an 
injunction to prevent the termination, stating that Fairmont 
had the right to seek damages as a result of the termination 
and that an injunction was not necessary to preserve this 
remedy.
In MSR Resort, Hilton’s claim includes the following 
items:
• brand damages—denied by the court,
• losses related to the defendants plan to expand the 
resort—denied by the court,
• group services expenses—partially accepted by the court, 
and
• key money—denied by the court.
In both M Waikiki and MSR Resort, the court was clear 
that the damages could flow only from those items specifi-
cally identified in the HMA. It uses this logic to deny the key 
money claim and the brand damages claim in MSR Resort. 
Interestingly, in MSR Resort, the judge cites M Waikiki in 
denying the claim for brand damages; “in that case, the court 
denied Marriott’s request for damages to reputation and 
goodwill associated with the hotel owners’ alleged breach of 
Marriott’s management agreement. The Court’s holding was 
based on the finding that Marriott presented no evidence of 
any damage to its brand reputation. Hilton argues that this 
case supports its position because the Hawaiian Court stated 
that its holding was without prejudice to the ultimate allow-
ance of Marriott’s claims. However, this case does nothing 
more than support the Court’s conclusion that Hilton cannot 
recover such damages without proof.”
Conclusion and Recommendations
When a hotel management agreement is terminated without 
the consent of the manager (outside of the provisions of the 
management agreement), the law clearly allows the manager 
to recover damages as a result of the termination. Recent 
court actions have made it clear that the parties to such an 
action have vastly different opinions regarding the amount 
owed as a result of an involuntary termination.
The methodology outlined in this paper provides a way 
to establish such termination damages with reasonable cer-
tainty. While many hotel management agreements contain 
a liquidated damages clause that establishes the termination 
fee when the parties agree to terminate the contract, these 
liquidated damages clauses are not applicable in a situation 
where the hotel management agreement is terminated even 
though the manager has not breached the contract. While 
termination fees have historically been in the range of 2 to 4 
times the most recent annual fees, the methodology outlined 
in this article seeks to estimate the present value of the dam-
ages to the manager as if the contract had not been terminat-
ed. These can easily be 10 to 20 times the most recent annual 
fees, depending on the remaining term of the contract. 
The numerical example we provide shows how this 
methodology would apply to a typical full-service hotel in 
the United States that is entitled to an annual fee (net of 
avoided costs) in the amount of $885,000 per year. If this 
contract had 25 years remaining, the damages estimate 
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would start at approximately $9,500,000, more than 10 times 
the annual lost fees. This amount does not include any claim 
for other damages such as recovery of key money, loan ad-
vances, or working capital; provisions for future claims from 
guests and groups; or the system-wide effects of a termina-
tion on the subject hotel and on the hotel brand.
While the net present value methodology may not pro-
vide certainty with respect to the award of damages, it does 
provide a systematic and acceptable approach to this conten-
tious topic. While each case is different in that the court 
may accept or reject certain items being claimed, those who 
follow the outline will have a good starting point from which 
to begin the conversation in the courtroom, in arbitration, 
or in mediation.
The methods advocated in this article are based on the 
general philosophy supported by the United States Courts. 
The basis of these calculations is that hotel management 
contracts have inherent value, and the operators need to 
be made whole if they are terminated prematurely without 
cause. While we present an overarching methodology, we 
close with the acknowledgment that each situation and each 
contract is unique. Thus, it is important for the analyst to 
have deep knowledge and experience in the type of hotel 
and its specific market so that the assumptions that drive the 
damages calculation have merit. n
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